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Brain-Based Determination 
of Death Revisited 
by 
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D. 
The author, a professor of pediatrics, is a Contributing Editor of the 
Linacre Quarterly. 
As I understand it, Dr. Alan Shewmon's defection from his 
previously held position of endorsing whole-brain death formulations 
is contingent on his abandonment of the axiom that the brain is the 
central integrating organ of the body. I While his arguments are 
cogent and impressively well documented, they are not necessarily 
persuasive nor do they seriously undermine the tenability of a 
position maintaining that the brain does perform a central integrating 
function. This latter position, as Dr. Shewmon points out, is currently 
held by the overwhelming majority of physicians including 
neurologists2 as well as an impressive array of theologians3,4,5 
including the advisers to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. 
The rationale for the acceptance of brain-based determination 
of death has been developed elsewhere in a Linacre Institute Paper.6 
The authoritative document on the conceptual aspects of the central 
integrator doctrine was published in 1981 by the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine.7 The 
clinical diagnostic criteria developed by the medical consultants to 
the Commission have become the "gold standard" for legislation in 
most states abiding by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and the 
Uniform Determination of Death Act.8 The term "brain death" has, 
with the continuing development of neurophysiologic and 
neuropathologic understanding, become synonymous with total brain 
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infarction which is tantamount to destruction of the body's primary 
central integrating organ and the loss of somatic integrative unity. 
Objective evidence consists in neuroimaging or blood-flow evidence 
that total brain infarction has occurred. 
Arguments against the Central Integrator theory include the 
Hassler experiments. These involve the restoration of consciousness 
to comatose patients by artificially stimulating the reticular activating 
system through an electrode stereotypically placed in intact basal 
gangliar structures. 9 Shewmon refers to these studies as raising the 
possibility of having a "conscious corpse" through the stimulation of 
the thalamic cortical system in a "brain dead" patient. As I interpret 
the Hassler experiments, however, the experimental subjects do not 
have the "irreversible cessation of function of the entire brain 
including the function ofthe brain stem" which would be required for 
the definition of death. Hassler's experimental subjects have intact 
cortical and thalamo-cortical systems. If these systems had been 
structurally inactivated as they would be in total brain infarction, 
consciousness would not be capable of restoration. In fact, Hassler 
refers specifically to the studies of McLardylO in which consciousness 
could not be restored because the midbrain reticular formation had 
been destroyed. The success of the Hassler experiments required an 
intact pallium and intact midbrain reticular formation. Such 
structural integrity is inconsistent with total brain infarction and 
therefore the possibility of a "conscious corpse" is fanciful and these 
experiments do not really seriously undermine "brain death" criteria. 
In a similar way, it is difficult to understand why the so-called 
"experiments of nature" (upper cervical cord transection or bulbar 
paralysis due to Guillain-Barre disease) truly undermine the validity 
of the concept of whole brain death. Both diagnoses would involve 
discemable electroencephalographic activity. The patient with an 
upper cervical transection still has a functioning brain stem 
presumably and the bulbar complication of Guillain-Barre disease 
almost invariably follows a preexistant polyneuronitis with an 
ascending Landry-type of paralysis. From a clinical standpoint, it is 
extremely far-fetched to presume that either of these entities could be 
confused with whole brain infarction. Imaging and blood flow 
studies would likely show an intact central nervous system 
circulation. The fact that the intensive care unit can substitute for the 
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brain stem by an elaborate scheme of technological assistance for 
respiration, blood pressure regulation fluid and electrolyte balance, 
parenteral nutrition and pituitary hormone replacement would 
reinforce as much as undermine the need for the central integration of 
the brain. There is no question that some individuals who fulfill the 
criteria for "complete and irreversible cessation of total brain function 
including the function of the brain stem" can be kept alive for finite 
periods of time with elaborate investments of high technology life 
support. There are even times when such support makes eminent 
good sense such as in the situation where a "brain dead" woman is 
gestating a pre-viable fetus. II The use of brain-based criteria for the 
determination of death, in the overwhelming majority of cases is to 
facilitate the decision-making process in which continuation of life 
support is contraindicated by the realities of the patient's hopeless 
prognosis. The various critiques of the validity of brain-based criteria 
for the determination of death make very little practical sense except 
in the context of a need to disqualify certain donors of unpaired 
organs for transplantation. 12 Likewise, the insistence on certain 
elaborate and comprehensive criteria for the declaration of death have 
very little application to the real world of clinical medicine. Bymel3 
for example insists that death must not be declared until there is total 
destruction of the circulatory and respiratory systems and destruction 
of the entire brain. He even suggests that lack of spontaneous 
breathing not be considered tantamount to destruction of the 
respiratory system until there is evidence for the disintegration of the 
biological capacity for exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide. The 
evidence to establish such a state would be so complex and elaborate 
that it is questionable that such a determination could be made as a 
practical clinical reality. What is obvious is that virtually all patients 
declared dead at home or in institutional settings have not yet reached 
the point of total destruction of all systems. There is some doubt as 
to whether there truly is an entity where the gas exchange function of 
the pulmonary tissues manifests itself in a patient on ventilatory 
support. Be that as it may, patients are being declared dead routinely 
when they stop breathing, when their heart stops beating, or when life 
support is discontinued and vital signs cease. This is universally 
accepted as proper procedure in a patient whose care is controlled by 
Do Not Resuscitate orders, but it would also be the case when 
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resuscitation has been attempted without success. The expected 
procedure in such cases would be to notify the next of kin that their 
loved one is "dead" (not dying) and to transport the patient to the 
morgue. Those who interpret death as an event rather than a process 
would have to concede that death as a theoretical end point of a 
process would not have occurred in most instances where "death" is 
declared. Those who hold the view that death is a process would 
accept that the death of the organism as a whole would precede the 
death of the whole organism. That is, that not all tissues 
simultaneously cease to function and death as a process would be 
consistent with persistent evidence of some focal or localized cell 
activity. This cellular activity might continue until some thermo-
dynamic endpoint is reached which is incompatible with any vital 
process. The rate of progression to this endpoint would vary from 
patient to patient depending on the functional reserve of certain vital 
organs, the preexistence of debilitative illness, the use of certain 
drugs in treatment and other unknown and unknowable factors. 
Shewmon l estimates that 20-30 minutes without circulation would be 
required but this is an estimate or an educated "guess" by his own 
description. 
What is being attempted by all conscientious attending 
physicians is to know the unknowable, that is the point at which the 
soul leaves the body. The overarching desire is to avoid declaring 
death before it has irreversibly occurred. However, the unwil-
lingness to acknowledge death when that state realistically occurred 
may very well be the predominant fear in the mind of terminally ill 
patients and the public at large. 14 The degree of certitude required in 
any instance would be influenced by the anticipated removal of an 
unpaired organ for transplantation. This is obviously related to the 
fact that the donor, if not already dead, will be killed by the transplant 
procedure. The dead donor rule requires that the donor be dead 
according to existing medical standards which currently would be 
"An individual who has sustained - either (1) Irreversible cessation 
of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) Irreversible cessation of 
all functions of the entire brain - is dead." (It is noted that this 
definition is not reliably accurate in the newborn period.) 1 5 
Whereas the original "Harvard Criteria" may have been 
tainted by wish fulfillment for transplant surgeons, 1 6 it is 
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inappropriately pejorative to continue to allege that the current 
refined and nuanced definition of brain-based criteria for the 
determination of death are merely an "invention" to allow live 
patients to qualify as donors. The vast majority of patients declared 
dead in a clinical setting will have died as a result of cessation of 
respiration and/or heartbeat. The vast majority of patients declared 
dead on the basis of "irreversible cessation of total brain function, 
including the function of the brain stem" will not even be candidates 
for organ donation but rather patients in whom discontinuation of 
artificial life support is contemplated. 
The rationale for declaring patients dead on the basis of brain-
based criteria will not be persuasive for all physicians caring for 
terminally ill patients. The majority of individual physicians who 
accept such criteria are not less "pro-life" than the minority whose 
consciences demand more rigid and vitalistic criteria, and it is a 
calumny to allege that they are. In fact, the National Right to Life 
Committee, the American College of Pro-Life Obstetricians, the 
American Association of Pro-Life Pediatricians, The National 
Commission on Human Life, and Americans United for Life all have 
expressed agreement with brain-based standards for the determination 
of death.6 The debate about brain death should be elevated to what it 
truly is - that is a scientific dialogue about the significance of 
certain irreversible losses of function. It is not a debate pitting 
predatory transplant surgeons and cynical grave robbers against a 
small embattled minority of purists and "legitimate" protectors of the 
sanctity of human life and should not be portrayed as such, even by 
innuendo. 
Dr. Shewrnon comments on the favorable reception given by 
audiences at international meetings to his disenchantment with brain-
based criteria for the declaration of death. I It should not be inferred, 
however, that the rejection of brain-based criteria is necessarily a call 
for stricter standards. Several of the authorities quoted by Dr. 
Shewmon are on record in the literature as proposing that since total 
brain death does not bear meticulous scientific scrutiny, that we can 
therefore assume that neocortical loss of function is equally valid in 
qualifying donors.17 Specifically, there has been a call for the 
recognition that patients in the so-called persistent vegetative state be 
qualified to donate organs for transplantation despite their having 
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brain stem function. This is, of course, merely a pennutation of the 
well-orchestrated effort (at one time endorsed by the American 
Medical Association Counsel on Ethical Affairs) to allow the 
donation of unpaired vital organs from "brain absent" anencephalic 
newborns. 18 
Dr. Shewmon correctly states that the medical community has 
fallen into the logical fallacy of accepting that absence of evidence of 
conscious activity constitutes evidence of absence. Recent 
experimental studies indicating irrefutable evidence of retained 
function of the neocortex in patients in persistent vegetative statesl9 
reinforces this reality. Even in patients in whom the cerebral cortex 
is physically missing, this fallacy can be demonstrated. Dr. Shewmon 
points to his experience with hydranencephaly in which children who 
lack cerebral development can yet demonstrate conscious interactive 
activity. I have had a similar experience in my own practice with a 
hydranencephalic child. During the AMA annual meeting in 1996, 
the AMA Council on Ethical Affairs held a hearing on the subject of 
anencephalic donors. There was dramatic testimony from a woman 
who was the grandmother of an anencephalic child as well as an 
educator with a Ph.D. in Child Development. This woman described 
her ability to elicit evidence for conscious abstraction ability in her 
grandchild who survived six months under close observation and 
stimulation. Both conditions, hydranencephaly and anencephaly can 
demonstrate significant plasticity in neuronal development. The 
experience with these allegedly "brain absent" infants as well as our 
burgeoning experience with suppressed conscious activity in 
comatose adults strongly recommend against neocortical death as a 
standard. 
British neurologists have maintained that the essence of 
"whole-brain" death is "brain stem" death since it is in the brain stem 
(including the hypothalamus) that somatic functions are integrated 
and consciousness is controlled by way of brain stem activation of 
cerebral hemispheres. The work of Pallis20, 21 in particular has 
endorsed brain stem death as the "physiological kernel" of brain 
death and the validity of declaring death on the basis of the evaluation 
of six critical brain stem reflexes plus the apnea test. Byrne and 
Nilges22 have advocated extending the definition of brain stem death 
to the evaluation of fourteen reflexes plus the apnea test. In 
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evaluating loss of function, the critical distinction between intrinsic 
irreversibility of loss of function (physical destruction) versus 
extrinsic irreversibility (intact structure) must be preserved. 1 Whole 
brain formulations which included destruction of the pallium and 
diencephalon would enhance the reliability of the determination of 
death as compared to brain stem death. 
The major impediment to the acceptance of brain-based 
standards for the determination of death drives from the field of 
cardiac transplantation. The reluctance to remove a "beating heart" 
from a donor declared dead on the basis of irreversible cessation of 
total brain function is largely intuitive and related to the ancient 
tradition of equating the end of life with the cessation of heartbeat. 
The need to overcome the powerful aversion to the removal of an 
actively beating heart among members of the transplant team has led 
to the development of the "Pittsburgh Protocol" and other procedures 
for the establishment of "non-heart-beating" cadaver donors.23 
Numerous transplant centers throughout the country are now adopting 
strategies for 1) the anticipation of impending cardiac failure 2) 
undertaking measures to guarantee proper organ perfusion and 
preservation, and then 3) declaring death after two minutes of 
asystole. Dr. Shewmon has entertained a modification of the 
Pittsburgh Protocol to allow for twenty minutes of systole prior to 
removal of the unpaired vital organs. 1 In either event, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that the protocol is more for the benefit of the 
spectators in the transplant team than for the donor. The ceremonial 
awaiting of a cardiac basis for declaring death would not necessarily 
improve upon the intellectual honesty or the respect for human life 
inherent in the acceptance of brain-based standards. Disclaimers to 
the contrary, the Byrne standard or the new Shewmon standard would 
effectively end 90% of all human organ transplantation, and possibly 
100% of unpaired vital organ transplantation. This would not be an 
unacceptable price to pay if the result were to be the restoration of a 
societal respect for the sanctity of human life that had somehow been 
lost in the acceptance of whole-brain death as tantamount to death of 
the person. 
I believe that respect for the sanctity of human life and the 
declaration of death by whole-brain standards are not mutually 
exclusive. If total destruction of the circulatory and respiratory 
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systems plus total destruction of the whole brain were to be 
scrupulously observed as the sine qua non of declaring death, respect 
for life would not necessarily improve since the logistical problems 
created in end of life decision making would be monumental. The 
small margin of increased certitude about the factual occurrence of 
death would be achieved at the expense of clinical chaos at the 
bedside. Most current polls indicate that 70% of lay people and 50% 
of physicians already endorse the concept of doctors killing patients 
through assisted suicide. 14 Any system which would increase the 
public perception of futile vitalism or ineffective technological 
intrusion into the determination of death might well be counter-
productive to the preservation of respect for end of life patients. It 
might also be a handicap in the crucial battle against euthanasia. 
In the words of Rabbi Immanuel Jacobvits, "If human life has 
infinite value, then any small fraction of human life has infinite value 
since any small part of infinity is still infinite." No live person should 
be treated as dead until truly dead. Death should not be declared until 
(a) the spontaneous functions of the heart and breathing have ceased 
or (b) there is irreversible arrest of all brain activity. This is the 
standard currently accepted by the majority of physicians including 
Catholic physicians. It is a position enunciated in the Charter for 
Health Care Workers24 which was derivative of the Pontifical 
Academy for Life and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 
The discussion of the issue of determination of death should continue 
in an atmosphere of mutual respect and a search for the truth. 
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